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Abstract
This paper illustrates the use of an easy-to-use, nonlinear von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function on wealth that can represent all types of risk behavior, including neutrality.  The linear-
exponential (LE) utility specification imposes no a priori restrictions on risk attitude.  The
empirical application uses firm-level data from Alaska’s groundfish fishery, indicating a diversity
of individual producer risk attitudes.Revenue Risk and Fishery Choice with Linear-Exponential Utility:
  An Application to Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Trawl Fisheries
Management of modern multispecies fisheries requires an understanding of how fishermen are
likely to respond to management initiatives.  The effects of regulations on fishermen's choice sets
and the subsequent fleetwide response with respect to species targeted, area fished, and resulting
changes in catches are not well understood for most fisheries.  Managers may regulate catch in
one fishery and be surprised by unanticipated effects in related fisheries.
Better knowledge of what broadly can be termed “behavioral response” in fisheries is
needed for at least two reasons.  One reason is to help improve inseason management of catch
rates among multispecies fisheries subject to binding catch quotas, to avoid premature closures
when a particular quota is exhausted and others of technologically-related species are not. Also,
better knowledge of fleet response to regulation is also needed for policy evaluation, i.e., for
helping to decide which regulations to enact in the first place.  These considerations are required
for US fisheries by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (PL 94-
265) and by Executive Orders to promote “optimum use” and consider (to the extent practicable)
both economic efficiency and the minimization of bycatch in promulgating regulations.
In characterizing fleet response to regulation, Wilen was among the first to develop
models of the interaction of regulator and regulated in fisheries, and applications have been made
to management of the Pacific halibut fishery (Homans and Wilen) and to the West Coast sablefish
fishery (Squires and Kirkley), among others.  In Alaska groundfish fisheries, some effort has been
made to account for catch reallocation in response to regulation (Smith and Lloyd; Ackley),
though these models do not address fishermen's choices or the technology used explicitly.2
Discrete choice models of fishery participation have been implemented by Bockstael and Opaluch
for the New England groundfish trawl fishery and by Evans for the California troll salmon fishery.
The purpose of this paper is to present a nonlinear discrete choice model of weekly fishery
choice in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) trawl fishery.  We use a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function which is parsimonious, yet capable of reflecting a variety of risk
attitudes.  The “Linear-Exponential” utility function is a hybrid of  negative exponential  and linear
utility functions, and depending on parameter values is capable of reflecting risk neutrality, risk
aversion with increasing, constant, or decreasing relative risk aversion, or risk-loving behavior.
Given the rich set of choices made by BSAI fishermen from among time-varying sets of target
fishery alternatives, we estimate the risk attitudes of the individual producers in the fishery.  We
find that some 60% of  producers exhibit risk neutral preferences, with nearly all the rest
exhibiting decreasingly absolute risk averse preferences.
The Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Trawl Groundfish Fisheries
There are a dozen or so distinct trawl fisheries operating on groundfish stocks in the BSAI region
off Alaska.  Trawl fisheries are the most significant in terms of gross product value, accounting
for 87-90% of the roughly $700-850 million in first wholesale value in 1991-92.  Some 70
producers used trawl gear in a fleet numbering 114 vessels in 1991 and 130 in 1992, and they
were responsible for the same relative proportion of operation-weeks.
The actual catch in a given fishery may consist of dozens of species, particularly in the
trawl fisheries, but the number of commercially important species groups is roughly a dozen.
Table 1 gives an indication of the multispecies nature of the trawl catch and effort.   Also,  the
trawl fisheries are the most most economically-significant of the BSAI groundfish fisheries.
Substitution patterns in these fisheries are the most interesting and flexible also, given the3
relatively large number of species that can be targeted.  Since gear changes are costly and may
involve significant reconfiguring of a vessel's physical plant, trawl fisheries are the only ones
where there is a significant choice to be made about what to target in the short run (e.g., within a
year).  For these reasons, we focus the analysis on explaining the choice of which trawl fishery to
participate in from among those open each week in 1991.
The Linear-Exponential Discrete Choice Model
Several recent papers have suggested more flexible empirical formulations of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function used for evaluating sensitivity of producer choices to risk
(Saha, 1993; Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz, 1994; Saha 1997).  These specifications have more
parameters (typically two rather than one) and are nonlinear in the parameters, so are capable of
reflecting a wider variety of risk attitudes than the standard single parameter utility functions.
The slight increase in complexity of estimation (as nonlinear optimization methods are required) is
generally a small price to pay for the increased generality.
This paper suggests an alternative two parameter utility model that is equally as
parsimonious, that is perhaps more appealing in terms of estimation, and, more importantly, can
represent all types of risk averse behavior along with risk neutrality.  The linear-exponential (LE)
utility function is
(1) uw w =+ - - qg b exp( ),
where the two key parameters of interest are g and b.  The presence of a linear term in wealth
means that risk neutrality can be represented if b=0 and g>0.  The exponential term indicates the
degree of risk aversion.
Taking the first two derivatives of (1) with respect to wealth, the Arrow-Pratt measure of

































Table 2 illustrates several implications of the LE utility model.  First, with g>0, the model
reflects risk aversion and, depending on the sign of b, can exhibit DARA, CARA, or IARA, since
from (3) sign(dA/dw) = -sign(b).  Second, there are two ways the model can represent CARA;
both under risk neutrality (where it is automatically implied since Aº0 for all w) and under risk
aversion.  Third, when g=0, b must be strictly positive for the model to represent economically
meaningful choices.  If it is not the case, the model implies nonpositive marginal utility.  In
empirical application, the joint hypothesis Ho: g=0, b£0 can be construed as a test of the model’s
validity, and failure to reject it is evidence that the model is inadequate to represent the behavior
implied by the data set.
Similarly, the change in the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RºAw) as wealth changes
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Under risk aversion, A is strictly positive and the type of relative risk aversion as wealth changes
is indicated by the sign of () 1 - ¢ b g wu .   When b>0 and g>0, the LE model can exhibit DRRA,
CRRA, or IRRA, depending on the relative magnitude of these two parameters in relation to
wu ¢ .  Table 2 shows the diversity of risk attitudes which can be represented with the LE model.5
Estimation Model
A generalized choice model, as described by Judge et al., considers an agent i who faces J
alternatives and chooses one of these.  Assuming that an individual maximizes utility in wealth,
the utility that the ith individual derives from the choice of the jth alternative can be represented
as the “average” utility over all alternatives plus an unobserved random disturbance term.  The
generalized expression is
UUe e ij ij ij ij ij ,, , , , , =+ = + x G
where xi,j is a (K ´ 1) vector of variables representing the attributes of the jth choice to the ith
individual,Gis a (K ´ 1) vector of unknown parameters, and ei,j is the random disturbance.  This
random disturbance reflects unobserved attributes of the alternatives.  The index K represents
characteristic variables common to all members of the population.  Having specified a utility
function, each individual is assumed to make a selection that maximizes their satisfaction.  The






















which is a general form of the logistic distribution function with the random disturbance term
distributed as Weibull.  It is the general form of this logistic function that is used to estimate the
parameters of the LE utility function.
In our empirical application, the second-order Taylor series expansion of the LE utility
model using the probability of choice expression in (4) is specified as6
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for all 46 weeks available for participation.  The var expression denotes variance.  The parameters
of this function can be expressed as vectors indexed over vessel-processors i=1...70, or jointly for
the industry as a whole (assuming common utility parameters for all).  Both parameter results are
presented. Wij ,   represents the vector of processor’s average quasi-rents for a particular week, and
ei,j are the random disturbances associated with the unobserved attributes of the participant’s
choice.  The denominator is the exponential sum of the utility model over all target species
alternatives j=1...11.  The left side of equation (5) is a vector of (0,1) probabilities of each
processor participating in each of the available target fisheries, indexed over the 46 weeks.  For a
particular week, only a subset of the 11 fisheries are available for participation.  Those available
receive a probability of either one (if the processor participates) or zero (if the processor did not
participate, but the alternative was available).  The total observations in this sample of 46 weeks,
70 processor, and a subset of the 11 fisheries available during a particular week is 7,028.
The nonlinear program used to estimate the LE utility function parameters is GAMS
MINOS version 5.3 (Brooke, et al.).  The objective of the estimation program is to solve for the
utility parameters by minimizing the sum of squared disturbance terms, ei,j.  The solving method
uses a reduced-gradient algorithm (Wolfe, 1962) combined with a quasi-Newton algorithm
(Davidon, 1959), which is implemented by following the procedures described in Murtagh and
Saunders (1978).  For the LE utility estimation, the nonnegativity constraint on the marginal
utility of quasi-rents is imposed.7











2 is the sum of the squared disturbance terms, ei,j, n is the number of observations, and Q
is the scalar resulting from the inner product of the two gradient vectors of the objective function
with respect to each of the parameters.
Results
Individual producer utility function parameter estimates are presented in Table 3, along with the
implied type of risk behavior.  Estimates for the whole fleet are also presented, under the
hypothesis that all producers have identical utility function parameters.  Results indicate that 60%
of the vessel-processors exhibit risk neutrality, while 40%  are risk averse.  Of the risk averse
producers, 64% have increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA), while 29% have constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA), and 7% have decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA).  Assuming the
same risk attitude for all operators, the industry-wide risk attitude toward quasi-rents using the
LE utility is DARA. Using the mean quasi-rents across processors and target fisheries, the
industry-wide relative risk aversion coefficient indicates DRRA for all weeks.
Because the programming equations in (11) and (12) are highly nonlinear in parameters,
estimation depends critically on appropriate parameter starting values.  For the LE utility function,
this was not a problem.  Results on the final parameter values were quite robust, with
convergence to the reported estimates for a wide range of starting values.8
Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Directions
We have estimated a nonlinear in parameters discrete choice model of the Bering
Sea/Aleutian Islands trawl groundfish fisheries, using data from the 1991 fishery.  This fishery is
among the most economically-valuable in the world, and is complex to manage because it
comprises a dozen or so commercially-important species caught in six-ten target fisheries,
depending on the time of the year.  The model uses a new utility function specification which is
capable of reflecting a wide variety of risk attitudes.  When individual risk attitudes are allowed to
vary, roughly 60% were found to exhibit risk neutrality, while 40% are risk averse, with a mixture
of relative risk aversion attitudes.  Sixty four percent of the risk averse producers had IRRA, 29%
had CRRA, and 7% had DRRA.
A notable feature of the model is that it relies on existing routine data collection efforts
rather than costly new primary data generation.  While much work needs to be done, it is hoped
that these models help illustrate how one can conceptually model the important linkages between
regulation and fleet response as a routine part of the management process. There are significant
limitations to the existing data, particularly on costs of operation, that prevent one from taking the
results of such models too seriously as yet.  To get better cost estimates, some level of routine
data collection on industry costs and performance is necessary.  But in the meantime, it is clear
that much profitable work can be done to help establish the modelling infrastructure which will
also be necessary once such improved cost data do become available.9
Footnotes
1.  An operation-week is one operation (a catcher processor or mothership) operating for a week.
2.  The exception to this rule is the pelagic (off-bottom) pollock fishery.  An operation has been
determined to have been targeting  pollock pelagically when the composition of retained catch
is at least 95% pollock.  Weeks with pollock as a plurality of catch, but less than 95%, are
classified as part of the bottom trawl fishery for pollock.
3.  Determining the “true” target species is not always trivial in multispecies trawl fisheries.
Occasionally tows come up with large unintended catches of species other than what the
skipper thinks (s)he is after.  Also, operations can at times covertly target some species under
the guise of targetting others, so long as catch remains less in volume than the that of the
target species.10
Table 1.  Trawl Effort and Trawl Catch Relative to Total Catch, 1991
                               
      Target                      Catch            Trawl    All
     Species                            Effort            Species                 Catch             Catch    
         --Operation-weeks--        --------metric tons--------
Atka Mackerel   83 Atka Mackerel 24,826 24,831
Pollock: Bottom Trawls 266 Pollock         1,032,369       1,034,675
Pollock Pelagic Trawls 647
Pacific Cod 255 Pacific Cod 64,819           143,229
Other Flatfish 111 Other Flatfish 28,013 28,252
Rockfish   43 Rockfish   8,528   8,934
Other Groundfish     0 Other Groundfish 15,504 22,332
Rock Sole 189 Rock Sole 50,385 50,403
Sablefish   12 Sablefish      518   2,140
Greenland Turbot     0 Greenland Turbot   5,949   7,012
Arrowtooth Flounder 16 Arrowtooth Flounder 14,224 16,279
Yellowfin Sole 355 Yellowfin Sole 83,243 83,247
Discards Only     9
Total          1,986     All Species        1,328,379       1,421,334
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d
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c
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aDARA, CARA, and IARA refer to decreasing, constant, and increasing absolute risk aversion,
respectively.
bDRRA, CRRA, and IRRA refer to decreasing, constant, and increasing relative risk aversion, respectively.
cThis combination of CARA and CRRA exists only for risk neutral (RN) preferences; under risk aversion
this set is empty.  All other non-empty cells represent risk averse preferences.
dEmpty set; these combinations of changes in absolute and relative risk aversion do not exist for risk averse
or neutral preferences.11
Table 3.  Estimated Producer Risk Attitudes
LE Utility
Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors Risk Aversion Type
Firm ID b st. error b g st. error g Absolute Relative
101 0.013 2.225 5.936 1.088 RN RN
102 1.577 3.977 3.918 0.756 RN RN
103 3.509 2.576 2.305 0.534 RN RN
104 6.410 1.224 3.278 0.491 DARA DRRA
105 4.171 2.574 3.968 0.616 RN RN
106 1.611 2.455 6.080 1.150 RN RN
107 0.004 1.490 6.891 1.402 RN RN
108 1.151 2.153 4.930 0.825 RN RN
109 4.639 2.841 1.978 0.492 RN RN
110 6.167 6.053 2.312 0.703 RN RN
111 6.260 0.378 2.953 0.863 DARA CRRA
112 3.955 1.922 3.966 0.458 DARA DRRA
113 8.379 20.441 6.059 1.093 RN RN
114 50.346 5.248 5.263 0.964 DARA CRRA
115 -1.757 3.774 8.972 1.295 RN RN
116 4.371 3.860 1.902 0.438 RN RN
117 3.795 1.998 2.171 0.598 DARA CRRA
118 3.815 2.659 2.836 0.666 RN RN
119 5.071 3.325 1.600 0.451 RN RN
120 2.512 2.716 3.041 0.451 RN RN
121 6.077 2.237 2.396 0.387 DARA CRRA
122 1.304 1.677 4.540 1.347 RN RN
123 5.276 2.581 1.628 0.480 DARA CRRA
124 6.014 2.718 1.915 0.805 DARA CRRA
125 4.588 1.983 2.219 0.962 DARA CRRA
126 3.465 6.822 2.992 0.828 RN RN
127 3.811 3.703 1.495 0.521 RN RN
128 0.597 2.798 6.145 0.397 RN RN
129 0.077 2.873 9.012 1.520 RN RN
130 4.451 2.653 1.520 0.746 DARA CRRA
131 2.430 3.257 4.705 0.450 RN RN
132 1.737 2.048 4.809 0.418 RN RN
133 5.490 3.023 1.942 1.339 DARA IRRA
134 5.530 2.268 1.799 0.518 DARA IRRA
135 5.768 1.814 1.983 1.171 DARA IRRA
136 1.601 3.462 5.664 0.454 RN RN
137 3.911 2.907 1.895 0.464 RN RN
138 7.070 2.333 2.085 0.432 DARA IRRA
139 0.066 3.297 8.841 0.979 RN RN
140 3.660 1.986 1.585 0.875 DARA IRRA
141 2.730 2.917 5.417 0.428 RN RN
142 0.040 4.166 7.460 0.527 RN RN
143 4.485 3.844 2.013 0.331 RN RN
144 0.033 1.848 7.296 1.351 RN RN
145 3.793 2.664 5.123 0.572 RN RN12
146 3.775 2.216 1.643 0.885 DARA IRRA
147 5.483 6.087 2.367 0.351 RN RN
148 4.037 3.824 1.490 0.456 DARA IRRA
149 3.916 2.426 2.210 0.378 RN RN
150 2.934 0.851 3.712 0.758 DARA IRRA
151 1.794 0.351 4.220 0.967 DARA IRRA
152 3.719 2.105 1.670 0.528 DARA IRRA
153 3.801 2.098 1.490 0.727 DARA IRRA
154 4.464 1.881 1.517 0.561 DARA IRRA
155 14.466 0.144 1.884 0.556 DARA IRRA
156 0.751 2.773 5.576 0.408 RN RN
157 5.983 3.169 2.223 0.353 DARA IRRA
158 3.914 2.458 1.443 0.604 RN RN
159 0.209 3.932 7.526 2.212 RN RN
160 3.740 3.381 3.689 0.393 RN RN
161 12.465 4.608 1.687 0.697 DARA IRRA
162 15.493 2.616 1.900 0.462 DARA IRRA
163 3.596 2.401 1.522 0.686 RN RN
164 5.275 2.572 1.930 0.368 DARA IRRA
165 4.439 2.681 1.510 0.507 DARA IRRA
166 0.158 1.677 5.717 0.363 RN RN
167 0.514 10.010 5.066 0.715 RN RN
168 0.824 4.468 5.206 0.347 RN RN
169 0.046 4.358 2.141 1.754 RN RN
170 -1.347 1.090 8.557 1.271 RN RN
Industry-wide 4.215 0.377 2.365 0.070 DARA DRRA13
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